Russia 2009 Arms Exports Exceed Expectations

Russia’s top arms exporter said Thursday that their sales last year grew 10 percent despite the economic crisis, as it looked to add new clients like Saudi Arabia, Libya and possibly even Afghanistan.

The export sales of state-owned arms exporter Rosoboronexport amounted to 7.4 billion dollars (5.2 billion euros) in 2009, up 10 percent on the previous year, the company’s head Anatoly Isaikin said.

“This is a figure that allows us to look with optimism into the future,” he told reporters, noting that the crisis failed to make a dent in Russia’s overseas arms sales.

Total Russian arms sales were set to top 8.5 billion dollars in 2009, Mikhail Dmitriyev, head of the Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation, said last month, citing preliminary estimates.

Rosoboronexport is the leading but not the only exporter of Russian-made weapons.

Isaikin said that as of today Rosoboronexport boasted an order book amounting to 34 billion dollars, including contracts worth 15 billion dollars from last year.

Dmitry Vasilyev, an analyst with the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, said Russian arms sales could be even more significant, were it not for the domestic industry’s inability to keep up with “rather high demand” for Russian arms.

He praised the arms exporter’s current order book, saying that “if there was a breakthrough it was in contracts.”

The United States is the world’s largest arms exporter, followed by several countries, including Russia, Britain and France.

Moscow’s traditional arms customers have been India, China, Algeria and Malaysia, with Venezuela and Syria becoming more recent clients.

Aircraft account for half of all arms exports.

Rosoboronexport is looking to add a number of new clients like Saudi Arabia and Libya as well as NATO member countries, Isaikin said, declining to more specific.

“Currently intensive talks on supplies of all kinds of weapons are under way” with Libya, a Soviet-era client, Isaikin said, adding he hoped the prospect of weapons sales to Saudi Arabia were also “good.”

On Wednesday, Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov discussed possible arms sales with his Libyan counterpart Abu Bakr Younis Jaber but officials did not say whether any firm agreements were in the pipeline.

Russian media reported earlier this week Libya was seeking to buy more than two billion dollars worth of Russian arms including 20 fighter planes.

Asked whether any deals could be signed during the Libyan delegation’s current visit, Isaikin told AFP the talks were “still continuing.”

Officials from Iraq and Afghanistan have also approached the Russians with a view to buying weapons but it would be up to the US administration to determine whether any such deals with Moscow could be possible, Isaikin added.

He reiterated Russia’s traditional stance that Moscow saw no “obstacle” to arms sales to Iran.

He declined however to disclose any new details on Russia’s controversial accord to sell Iran sophisticated S-300 air defence systems, which have yet to be delivered in a deal that alarmed the United States and Israel.

Rosoboronexport, Isaikin said, detected keen interest from foreign countries in the S-400, Russia’s latest generation of air defense missile systems, and “there are a lot of preliminary talks.”

However, the weapons would first be supplied to the country’s own army, while selling it overseas would be a matter of “distant future”, he said.

China Continues Miliatary Expansion yet China Suspends Military Exchanges with U.S. over Military Sales to Taiwan

BEIJING – Today China suspended military exchange visits with the United States on Saturday in protest over $6.4 billion in planned U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and warned the U.S. ambassador that the sales would harm already strained ties.

The state-run Xinhua News Agency cited the Defense Ministry as saying the suspension is due to the “severe harm” of the arms sales on the two countries’ military relations.

China took a similar step in 2008 after the former Bush administration announced a multibillion-dollar arms sale to Taiwan — the most sensitive issue in U.S.-China relations. The latest arms sales could complicate the cooperation the U.S. seeks on issues ranging from Iran’s nuclear program to the loosening of Internet controls, including a Google-China standoff over censorship.

China claims the self-governing Taiwan as its own, while the United States is Taiwan’s most important ally and largest arms supplier. The U.S. government is bound by law to ensure the island is able to respond to Chinese threats.

Though Taiwan’s ties with China have warmed considerably since Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou took office 20 months ago, Beijing has threatened to invade if the island ever formalizes its de facto independence. China has more than 1,000 ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan.

Moreover, the Pentagon reported that China is continuing its ballistic-missile buildup aimed at a force of over 1,000 missiles by 2008. During 2005, China deployed nearly 800 mobile DF-11 and DF-15 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to bases opposite Taiwan.

“SRBM deployment continues to expand at an average rate of about 100 missiles per year. Newer versions feature improved range and accuracy,” noted the U.S. report.

The arms sale, posted Friday on a Pentagon Web site, includes Black Hawk helicopters, Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missiles, mine hunter ships and information technology. Congress has 30 days to comment before the plan goes forward. Lawmakers traditionally have supported such sales.

Upcoming high-level visits are likely to be affected by the China’s suspension of military exchanges. Gen. Chen Bingde, the Chinese military’s chief of the general staff, was due to visit the U.S., while U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, had planned to come to China.

A phone call to China’s defense ministry seeking comment was not answered Saturday. A spokeswoman for the U.S. Embassy, Susan Stevenson, said the embassy had no comment on the suspension of military visits.

The two powers are increasingly linked in security and economic issues, and Washington has sought to raise the profile and frequency of military visits with China and build trust with Beijing to convince it to reveal more about the aims of its massive military buildup.

But overall ties have been tense as President Barack Obama plans to meet with the Dalai Lama, the exiled spiritual leader of Tibet, later this year. Further complications from the Taiwan arms sale could affect President Hu Jintao’s expected visit to the U.S. this year, as well as talks on human rights that Obama and Hu had agreed to continue.

Obama’s national security adviser, Jim Jones, said in a speech Friday that both Washington and Beijing do things “periodically that may not make everybody completely happy” but that the United States is “bent toward a new relationship with China as a rising power in the world.”

But experts in China warned it could take further steps to punish the United States to underscore its newfound power and confidence in world affairs.

Also Saturday, Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei warned U.S. Ambassador Jon Huntsman that the $6.4 billion sale would “cause consequences that both sides are unwilling to see.” The vice minister urged that the sale be immediately canceled, it said.

The U.S. is “obstinately making the wrong decision,” China’s Foreign Ministry said in a statement.

Jin Canrong, a professor of international studies at China’s Renmin University, said the sale would give Beijing a “fair and proper reason” to accelerate weapons testing.

Beijing has test-fired rockets in recent weeks for an anti-missile defense system in what security experts said was a display of anger at the pending arms sale.

“The U.S. will pay a price for this. Starting now, China will make some substantial retaliation, such as reducing cooperation on the North Korea and Iran nuclear issues and anti-terrorism work,” Jin added.

The arms package, however, dodges a thorny issue: more advanced F-16 fighter jets that Taiwan covets are not included.

The Pentagon’s decision not to include the fighters and a design plan for diesel submarines — two items Taiwan wants most — “shows that the Obama administration is deeply concerned about China’s response,” said Wang Kao-cheng, a defense expert at Taipei’s Tamkang University.

Taiwan’s president Ma told reporters Saturday that the deal should not anger the mainland because the weapons are defensive, not offensive.

“The weapons sale decision will … allow us to have more confidence and sense of security in developing cross-Strait relations,” he said.

India Developing Means To Destroy Satellites

India has begun development of lasers and an exoatmospheric kill vehicle that could be combined to produce a weapon to destroy enemy satellites in orbit, the director-general of India’s defense research organization said Jan. 3.

“The kill vehicle, which is needed for intercepting the satellite, needs to be developed, and that work is going on as part of the ballistic missile defense program,” said V.K. Saraswat, director-general of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), which is part of India’s Ministry of Defence.

In a televised press briefing during the 97th Indian Science Congress in Thiruvananthapuram, Saraswat said the program includes the development of lasers “which will be able to give you a concrete picture of the satellite, and use that picture to guide your kill vehicle towards that. That work has yet to be done.”

The DRDO expects to have all the building blocks ready between 2012 and 2014, he said. An interceptor missile with a range of 120 to 140 kilometers will be test fired in September 2010, he said.

Saraswat said that while work on individual components of the system is going on, the anti-satellite (A-Sat) weapon will be built and tested only “if and when the country needs it.” Saraswat, who is also the scientific adviser to the defense minister, said space security is going to be a major issue in the future and that India should not be left behind.

Russia’s first stealth fighter makes maiden flight

MOSCOW – Russia’s first stealth fighter intended to match the latest U.S. design made its maiden flight Friday, boosting the country’s efforts to modernize its rusting Soviet-built arsenals and retain its lucrative export market.

The Sukhoi T-50′s flight comes nearly two decades after the first prototype of the U.S. F-22 Raptor took to the air, and Russian officials said it will take another five years for the new jet to enter service. Still, the flight marked a major step in Russia’s efforts to burnish the faded glory of its aviation industries and strengthen a beleaguered military.

The sleek twin-engined jet closely resembling the Raptor flew for 47-minutes from an airfield at Sukhoi’s production plant in the Far Eastern city of Komsomolsk-on-Amur on Friday. Development of the so-called fifth-generation fighter has been veiled in secrecy and no images of it had been released before the flight.

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin hailed the flight as a “big step forward,” but admitted that “a lot remains to be done in terms of engines and armament.”

Craig Caffrey, an analyst for Jane’s Defense Procurement-Military Aircraft, said the new fighter is “hugely important,” both for modernizing the aging Russian air force fleet and retaining export markets.

“The T-50 should offer the Russian Air Force a significant boost in its capabilities and ensure that it remains one of the best equipped air forces in the world,” he told The Associated Press by e-mail.

Caffrey said the new fighter will attract many foreign customers. “For those countries that don’t traditionally purchase military equipment from the U.S. it will be the only fifth generation aircraft available,” he said.

The NPO Saturn company said in a statement that the jet has new engines, but military analysts suggested that they were a slightly modernized version of the Soviet-era engine powering the Su-27 family of fighters.

“It’s a humbug,” said independent military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer. “It’s just a prototype lacking new engines and a new radar. It takes new materials to build a fifth-generation fighter, and Russia lacks them.”

Putin said Friday the first batch of new fighters is set to enter an Air Force evaluation unit in 2013 and serial production is set to begin in 2015.

Caffrey said the task looks “very challenging, given the amount of new technology that is being incorporated into the new aircraft.”

Russian military analysts were also skeptical, pointing at a history of delays in the program and other Russian weapons projects.

“The schedule will likely be pushed back as usual,” said Alexander Konovalov, the head of the Moscow-based Institute of Strategic Assessment, an independent think tank.

Russia’s prospective Bulava intercontinental ballistic missile has failed in at least eight of its 12 test launches, dealing a blow to Russia’s hopes of making it a cornerstone of its nuclear arsenal. Officials have blamed the failures on manufacturing flaws resulting from post-Soviet industrial degradation.

Felgenhauer and other observers said the fighter program, which depends on hundreds of subcontractors, has been dogged by similar problems.

Russian officials have said the new fighter, like the Raptor, will have supersonic cruising speed and stealth capabilities. Its pilot, Sergei Bogdan, said in televised remarks that it was easy and pleasant to fly.

While officials saw the new fighter as essential, some analysts said the country has more pressing needs.

“There is no mission and no adversary for such plane,” Konovalov said, adding that the Russian military lacks a modern communications system and satellite navigation. “It would be more expedient to fit modern avionics to older generation jets.”

The U.S. administration decided to quit buying the F-22 Raptor, the world’s most expensive fighter jet at more than $140 million apiece, effectively capping its production at the 186 already ordered.

Closer Look: Shenzhou-7’s Close Pass by the International Space Station

On September 27, 2008 during its 31^st orbit, China’s Shenzhou-7 space mission achieved two of its main objectives: China’s first manned extra vehicular activity (EVA) or space walk, and the first launch of the 40kg BX-1 microsatellite for the purposes of testing new microsatellite technologies, and observing and operating in cooperation with the Shenzhou. The spacewalk by Chinese astronaut Zhai Zhigang received massive coverage in China and internationally and the microsatellite mission was also covered well by the Chinese media. What the Chinese media did not cover, and even more surprisingly has so far gone unremarked by the United States or Russian governments, was the fact that about 4 hours after launching the BX-1, the Shenzhou-7 flew to a distance of about 45km (27 miles) from the International Space Station (ISS). 

The U.S. National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) and the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) devote considerable resources to protect the $35-$100 billion^[1] International Space Station from possible collisions with space debris. On rare occasions large object do get close enough to the ISS to warrant avoidance maneuvering. When traveling at Low Earth Orbit speeds of 7.7km per second, or about 17,000 mph, objects smaller than 5mm pose a threat to the ISS and have to be regarded seriously. According to calculations by the U.S. Strategic Command, the Shenzhou-7 reached a point about 45km below and forward-right of the ISS on September 27, 2008. The difference in orbital altitude of the respective spacecraft ensured that there was no danger of collision. But the Shenzhou-7 had just launched its previously untested BX-1 microsatellite and a possible malfunction might have very quickly posed a potential danger to the ISS. An October 2, 2008 Chinese state television report noted that in the hours after it’s launching, this microsatellite “had started drifting away from its intended trajectory,” meaning its potential to have posed a danger to the ISS is not unfounded. 

	International Space Station: On September 27, 2008, China’s Shenzhou-7 spacecraft flew to a position about 45km below and in front of the US and Russian manned International Space Station. Source: NASA

To date it is not known whether China made any attempt to warn Washington or Moscow that its spacecraft were going to approach the ISS, or that its microsatellite was departing from its “intended trajectory.” But even if that happened, it is still necessary to ask questions about China’s potential motivations. The orbit used by Shenzhou-7 was almost the same as used by the previous two manned Shenzhou missions, and an ability to reach the ISS points toward obvious opportunities for cooperation. However, it is not assuring that China’s manned space program is controlled completely by the China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which has made dual civil-military use of all previous six Shenzhou spaceship missions. The PLA may have plans to develop active space combat capabilities and one military “dual use” for the Shenzhou-7/BX-1 mission may have been to validate a “co-orbital” anti-satellite capability. This would contrast with the “direct ascent” ASAT capability demonstrated by China in January 2007. As such, the silence from Washington and Moscow on this matter is troubling. 

	BX-1 Before Launch: This picture shows the BX-1 microsatellite mounted on top of the orbital module of the Shenzhou-7 spacecraft, before assembly for launch. Source: Chinese Internet

Timeline of Events 

Shenzhou-7 was launched on September 25 at 21:10 Beijing Time (13:10 Universal Time/Greenwich Mean Time UTC/GMT), for a mission that would last 68.27 hours. September 27^th was a day of national triumph for China as the Chinese leadership and through a wide television audience, Chinese observed in real time the first space walk by a Chinese astronaut. As can best be determined from available data, a timeline for major activities that day of the Shenzhou-7 is as follows: 

08:43 UTC/GMT: Spacewalk by Zhai Zhigang starts and last for about 15 to 19.35 minutes. 

11:24 UTC/GMT: At a point about 500km from the ISS the Shenzhou-7 launches the BX-1 microsatellite. 

15:07 UTC/GMT: At 4.13 hours later, likely in the skies between Australia and New Zealand, Shenzhou reached its closest 45km proximity with the ISS. 

Timing for the Shenzhou space walk and the launch of the BX-1 microsatellite has been reported by the official Chinese media.^[2] These are usually in Beijing Time and require the subtraction of 8 hours to get UTC/GMT. The source of the initial indication of the Shenzhou pass by the ISS appears to have been generated by a non-government observer, who placed proximity data based on a Collision Avoidance (COLA) program for satellites, on popular Western and Russian space issue web forums. This individual estimated that the Shenzhou-7 would approach to 36.6km from the ISS at 15:07 UTC/GMT.^[3] This data was then apparently copied on to a popular Chinese web page where it was first viewed by this analyst.^[4] In addition, an amateur space satellite observer noted the opportunity to observe the Shenzhou-7 and ISS in close proximity on September 27 over New Zealand.^[5] 

Danger of Collision? 

According the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), which among many other duties, monitors all objects of interest in outer space, has concluded that despite a close proximity pass between Shenzhou-7 (SZ-7) and the ISS on September 27, there was no danger of a collision between these two spacecraft, provided they maintained their established orbits. The description by USSTRATCOM relayed to the IASC by the NASA Public Affairs Office on October 7, 2008 is as follows: 

“The highest apogee [farthest orbital point from the Earth] for SZ-7 vehicle was, per USSTRATCOM 336 km.  Lowest perigee [closest orbital point to the Earth] for ISS was 347 km.  The total distance between SZ-7 and ISS at the time noted in the Chinese website (http://www.war-sky.com/forum/htm_data/18/0809/258773.html) was 45 km on September 27, 2008 (271/15:07 GMT), 18km below x 41km ahead x 8km starboard at Time of Closest Approach (TCA). SZ-7 speed relative to ISS was 3.1 km/s.”^[6] 

USSTRATCOM also relayed that even if there had been perfect alignment between the Shenzhou-7 and the ISS, the closest possible approach would have been to 11km, provided the Shenzhou-7 did not alter its orbit.^[7] 

But in addition to the proximity of the larger spacecraft, it is also necessary to consider the proximity of the BX-1 microsatellite as it orbited the Shenzhou-7 craft.  According to a Chinese CCTV state television report aired on October 2, 2008, “After the satellite was released by the Shenzhou 7 last weekend it started drifting away from its intended trajectory.”^[8]   According to another Chinese report from October 5, “Since September 30, the control center changed its track six times to draw it closer to the space  vehicle step by step, and finally it succeeded in orbiting the capsule [settling ] on an elliptical track of 4 kilometers multiplying 8 kilometers.”^[9]   One might conclude then, in the hours after its launch, the BX-1 microsatellite’s distance from the Shenzhou-7 was increasing.  Unclear, however, was the orbital inclination or flight angle of the BX-1 around the Shenzhou-7, though pictures of later returned by the BX-1 show that it flew “above” the Shenzhou-7.  But one tentative conclusion would be that in the hours before passing the ISS, the BX-1’s orbit around Shenzhou was expanding upward in a direction that would have taken it closer to the ISS.  The apparent fact that it was also malfunctioning at this time could have led to conditions that might have taken it even closer to the ISS.  According to USSTRATCOM, the Shenzhou-7, and presumably the BX-1, were traveling 3.1km/s faster (6,696mph) than the ISS.  Would there have been time for the U.S. to react?  

	BX-1 After Launch: These photos were taken by the BX-1 microsatellite soon after its launch on September 27. One photo clearly shows that the BX-1 was able to reach a position above the Shenzhou-7 spacecraft. Source: Chinese Internet

The U.S. And China Were Watching 

USSTRATCOM is responsible for tracking objects in space of security concern to the United States. The U.S. Air Force’s AN/FPS-85 phased array radar located at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida is reportedly capable of tracking 90 percent of man-made space objects, down to “softball” size objects up to 300nm (540km) in outer space. Furthermore, the Air Force controls the distributed AN/FPS-133 radar surveillance “fence” that can track all man-made objects in space, which has been recently upgraded to provide 3-Dimensional tracking plots.^[10] 

In addition, Australia’s Tidbinbilla Deep Space Tracking Centre, which hosts radar jointly manned by NASA and Australian personnel, would have likely been able to monitor the Shenzhou-7’s passage on its September 27 close pass with the ISS near New Zealand. A third potential source of surveillance would have been the deeper-space U.S. infrared missile early warning satellites, but it is not known whether these would have been monitoring the Southern Hemisphere on September 27. While the U.S.-based radar facilities would have been able to quickly supply data for potential maneuvers for the ISS to avoid the larger Shenzhou-7, it is not known whether the Tidbinbilla radar would have been able to track any potential errant BX-1 events in time to provide proper warning. 

	Tidbinbilla: This joint-US-Australian Deep Space monitoring facility has supported all U.S. manned space missions, and was likely watching closely as the Shenzhou-7 craft approached the ISS on September 27, 2008. Source: NASA

It is also worth noting that China’s space surveillance system had a clear view of the Shenzhou-7 pass by the ISS. The PLA maintains a fleet of space support ships which are deployed to the Pacific, Indian and Atlantic Oceans to compensate for China’s lack of global land bases for space surveillance. A briefing by Li Ming of the China Academy of Space Technology, given on October 2, 2008 at the International Astronautical Conference, shows that one of China’s space tracking ships was positioned to the North of New Zealand, where it would have had an excellent view of the Shenzhou-7 close pass by the ISS on September 27.^[11] China likely deployed a space events ship to this same area to support the 2005 Shenzhou-6 mission.^[12] 

	China Also Watched: An outtake from Li Ming’s October 2, 2008 briefing of the International Astronautical Congress shows the positioning of China’s space events ships, including one North of New Zealand. Source: Li Ming via Rob Coppinger, Flight International

According to USSTRATCOM it is standard practice for the U.S. to monitor intently all objects entering a “conjunction notification box” around the ISS that measures 25x25km, and then 2km deep. Should an object be assessed as having the potential to enter this box that would trigger a reaction by the ISS by NASA controllers. On August 28, 2008 the ISS had to use a boost from the European “Jules Verne” Automated Transport Vehicle (ATV) to avoid a piece of an old Russian radar satellite, which otherwise would have passed to within one mile of the ISS. The previous time the ISS had to perform a similar maneuver was in 2003.^[13] On September 29, 2008 the Russian satellite piece was expected to pass to about 30km from the ISS.^[14] An orbital adjustment scheduled for October 2, to facilitate a Russian Progress resupply vessel was delayed to October 4 in order to avoid the Soviet satellite fragment.^[15] 

The U.S. is also concerned about smaller objects, that when traveling at normal space velocities, could cause great damage to the ISS. According to one 2002 study objects less than 5mm in size may pose a threat to the ISS.^[16] Loss of atmosphere is not an unknown danger. The failure of a ventilation valve during the initial June 30, 1971 re-entry maneuvers of the Soviet Soyuz-11 spacecraft saw the loss atmosphere in about 115 seconds, leading to the near immediate deaths of three Cosmonauts.^[17] Two Russian Cosmonauts, Sergei Volkov, Oleg Kononenko, and one American, Gregory Chamitoff, were aboard the ISS on September 27. Had there been a malfunction of the BX-1 in the circumstances of September 27, it is not clear whether the ISS would have received sufficient warning to undertake avoidance maneuvers, increasing the chance of having to evacuate the ISS. 

	Possible Chinese Admission?: This computer simulation video outtake aired on October 2, 2008 indicates that the BX-1 microsatellite was out of control soon after its launch on September 27, 2008. Note the upward trajectory for the microsatellite. A second outtake appears to show an elliptical BX-1 orbit around the Shenzhou. Source: CCTV

Potential Reasons for Proximity Pass 

Given the dangers of operating in close proximity, why did the Chinese military-space authorities take the risk of putting the Shenzhou-7 on an orbital path that would take it so close to the ISS? On one level, the timing and path of the Shenzhou-7 mission was dictated by its operational requirements. On September 6 the Chinese media announced a launch window between September 25 and 30. The timing of the lift-off on September 25 was selected in order to provide an appropriate “daylight” window for the space-walk on September 27. Fears of poor weather may have also played role in the final timing. The orbital altitude was also similar to the previous two Shenzhou manned missions in 2005 and 2003.^[18] Yet it has to be considered that the Chinese leadership was well aware of the predicted ISS path, as well as that of the Shenzhou for any potential launch window, and could have delayed its launch for an appropriate period to greatly increase the closest possible distance between the two spacecraft. 

With an assumption of such knowledge, then China’s decision to time the Shenzhou-7 flight path to coincide with the ISS could be regarded as consistent with the dual civil-military nature of all previous Shenzhou missions. The first four unmanned missions in 1999, 2001 and 2002, plus the first two manned missions in 2003 and 2005, all performed either electronic or electro-optical surveillance missions for PLA, in addition to “science” missions, largely to validate spacecraft technology. Shenzhou-7’s key science mission was to validate China’s Russian-inspired EVA suit technology, advance some technologies needed for future space station missions, and launch the dual civil-military BX-1 microsatellite. The PLA, as have Chinese military leaders historically, place great importance on the skillful practice of many forms of deception. It would not be beyond consideration for the PLA to have “hidden” a larger Shenzhou-7 military exercise in plain sight. 

And even though China has been largely transparent about much of the content of the Shenzhou-7 mission, one has to consider that whether deliberate or not, the timing of the BX-1 launch just before reaching its closest proximity to the ISS, could also serve to validate a potential “co-orbital” anti-satellite (ASAT) technology. Co-orbital anti-satellite systems, which catch up to the target in orbit, were the preferred ASAT technology option of the former Soviet Union. In the early 1960s the design bureau of Vladimir Chelomei, Anatoly Savin and NPO Lavochkin combined to develop the Istrebitiel Sputnikov (IS), or Interceptor Satellite. The Soviets launched about 40 IS and target satellites between 1963 and 1982 to test and practice this ASAT method.^[19] The advantage is that a “co-orbital” ASAT could take advantage of the slower less powerful rockets of the time, but use accuracy and timing to ensure interception. The direct-ascent ASAT tests demonstrated by the PLA from 2005 to 2007 required a much faster missile, which the PLA has in the KT-1/SC-19 vehicle. 

	Istrebitiel Sputnikov: From 1963 to 1982 the former Soviet Union launched about 40 IS interceptors and target satellites to perfect “co-orbital” ASAT capabilities. Source: NPO Machinostroyenia

Also, in 1964 the Soviet’s Korolev design bureau began working on a military variant of its Soyuz manned spacecraft, which remains the Russian manned space workhorse, and guided the design of the Chinese Shenzhou. At first it was proposed that Cosmonauts leave the Soyuz to inspect or destroy enemy satellites, and when that was judged too risky, it was proposed that the Soyuz launch unguided rocket mines at the enemy satellite. It was also proposed that a modified two-part Soyuz craft provide in-orbit refueling to allow ASAT operations up to orbits of 6,000km. However, in 1966 following the death of Korolev, the Soviet military cancelled plans for combat versions of the Soyuz, moving manned combat platform development to Chelomei’s bureau, and instead concentrated on unmanned ASAT programs.^[20] It is likely that China is much aware of the military history of the Soyuz. China’s decision to adopt the Shenzhou’s orbital module for military surveillance missions at least points to the possibility that China may also be considering space-combat modifications for the Shenzhou orbital module. 

	Surveillance Shenzhou: This collection of pictures of the Shenzhou orbital modules from the first five missions show their ELINT, radar surveillance and electro-optical surveillance payloads. Source: Chinese Internet

  

While also having the potential for being developed for many non-kinetic communication or surveillance missions, BX-1 microsatellite could also be used as the basis for a satellite interceptor for surveillance or destruction missions. Its relatively low-resolution camera could be replaced with a much higher resolution system with longer range to image and home in on selected targets. A small boost motor might provide enough power for a direct path toward a close target, with course corrections supplied by the liquid-ammonia-powered thrusters as used by the BX-1. It is also possible that the interceptor stage of the SC-19 ASAT vehicle could provide the basis for an interceptor that could be used by a military-Shenzhou or other future Chinese unmanned or manned spacecraft. 

	Combat Shenzhou Preview ?: This video outtake shows a simulation of the BX-1 launching from the Shenzhou-7 spacecraft. Could this also preview active combat modifications for the Shenzhou orbital module? Source: Li Ming via Rob Coppinger, Flight International

While consistent with its position for at least one previous Shenzhou mission, the location of the PLA space tracking ship near New Zealand was also “convenient” for providing targeting data and monitoring for a potential military exercise. Assuming it was a military exercise, then it possible to consider that the PLA may view the conduct of such ASAT operations in the Southern Hemisphere as preferable due to a lack of U.S. space monitoring in these regions. 

China’s leadership may also be attempting to send political-military messages by having used its BX-1 as it did on September 27. A close pass by the ISS, in a manner following China’s direct-ascent ASAT exercises from 2005 to 2007, may be intended to tell Washington that China will not be constrained in its behavior in Outer Space. Also, in attempting to create a “near incident,” that came close but did not trigger defensive measures for the ISS, China may also be trying to strengthen the arguments of those in the U.S. foreign policy and space policy establishment who have long advocated for a higher level of space cooperation with China. The prospect of improving flight safety would be an attractive incentive. The ultimate goal for China might be to gain active access to the ISS itself. The next set of Shenzhou missions are slated to test and validate space docking technology and maneuvering. China has apparently purchased significant amounts of space station technology from Russia, including a version of the Russian APAS docking system^[21], which China will likely closely copy, and then possibly use to support future missions to the Russian half of the ISS. China would also like to benefit from Western and European manned space technology gained from operations with the ISS.^[22] Gaining access to the ISS would also require a level of political acceptance for China that would make possible the weakening or even elimination of U.S. and European Tiananmen-reactive “embargos” and many other restrictions to high technology access. 

Cooperation or Confrontation? 

If China had been interested in using the Shenzhou-7 mission to advance international cooperation, it could have earned considerable plaudits by notifying Washington and Moscow of its planned proximity pass with the ISS. Even though some might have objected to the dangers of using the untested BX-1 so close to the ISS, there are plenty of U.S. and European officials who would have been flattered by China’s effort to reach out and “build confidence.” Yet China apparently chose not to do so despite the dangers from its microsatellite launching, now apparently confirmed by China’s own media reports. Instead, Chinese officials offered comments that could be interpreted as deceptive. 

During a September 22 conversation with reporters, Major General Cui Jijun, commander of the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center (responsible for launching Shenzhou-7), responded to a question in which unidentified “foreign reports” had suggested that Shenzhou-7’s microsatellite would be an “offensive weapon.” Cui, whose command puts him in good position to advance to higher levels of the General Armaments Department, was said to respond with a “loud and hearty laugh.” He then was reported as saying “seriously, a small satellite is not a missile,” and then he was quoted saying “I believe that in the vastness of space, wide space, that the chance of collision between two small satellites is highly unlikely…there is no need to take the initiative to attack other countries satellites.”^[23] This report does not record General Cui saying anything about how Shenzhou-7’s microsatellite would actually be launched in a manner that could threaten the manned International Space Station. Cui’s comments serve to recall China’s consistent and vocal opposition to the militarization of space since the early 1980s, with China having undertaken multiple missile and laser-based anti-satellite programs since at least the early 1990s. 

	Major General Cui Jijun: The commander of the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center, responsible for the launch of Shenzhou-7, discounted the chance of a satellite “collision” during a September 22 interview. Source: Chinese Internet

Clearly, it would behoove the interests of China as well as the United States if there could be greater cooperation in space that would create the confidence necessary to avoid tragic space accidents or a space-arms race. The United States and Russia were able to reach such an accommodation in the early 1990s because Moscow has abandoned its expansive military-space ambitions, albeit due to the economic crisis caused by the collapse of the Soviet economy. Had there been no Soviet collapse in 1990 the U.S. may have had to contend with Soviet space weapons like the Skif/Polyus laser platform, large and small armed space planes like the Buran and MAKS programs, and even a potential military space station with docked space shuttle bombers based on the Buran space plane.^[24] 

	Weapons and Deception: Seen before its May 15, 1987 failed test flight, the Soviet Skif-DM/Polyus laser weapon space platform is famously seen with the Russian word “MIR” or “Peace,” written on its side. Source: Internet

As long as China’s space program is in the hands of its generals it will largely reflect the PLA’s strategic requirements. This was the case for the former Soviet Union where the military also controlled the Soviet space program. As seen by its development of multiple ASAT systems, its willingness to make military use of manned space programs and its outright deceptions, China is increasingly following the Soviet example of seeking military dominance of outer space. China’s January 2007 ASAT demonstration, following years of gathering Chinese military-academic writing on the need for China to develop space warfare capabilities, combined with its space arms control diplomacy of deception, provided a clear warning that China was not yet interested in building the confidence necessary for cooperation in space. Does China’s September 27 close pass by the ISS with the Shenzhou-7 and an untested microsatellite constitute a second such demonstration?

 

 

---

^[1] Alan Boyle, “Whats the cost of the space station?,” MSNBC.com, August 25, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14505278/ ; A 2005 European estimate held that the ISS would cost up to 100 billion Euros for assembly and ten years of operations, see, European Space Agency Web Page, August 9, 2005, http://asimov.esrin.esa.it/esaHS/ESAQHA0VMOC_iss_0.html 

^[2] Timing for Shenzhou-7 events from “67 Hours 27 Minutes: Shenzhou-7 Flying Times, Xinhua, September 28, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-09/28/content_10130620.htm 

^[3] Collision Avoidance (COLA) data posted by “Liss” on the NASAspaceflight.com web forum, September 27, 2008, http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=5137.735; and then repeated by “Lss,” Novosti I Kosmonavtiki web forum, September 27, 2008, http://www.novosti-kosmonavtiki.ru/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?t=7798&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=375 

^[4] Posted by “zjjr” Warsky web page, September 27, 2008, http://www.war-sky.com/forum/htm_data/18/0809/258773.html 

^[5] Robert Holdsworth, “ISS and Shenzhou-7 to pass close to each other over NZ,” www.satobs.org, September 27, 2008, http://www.satobs.org/seesat/Sep-2008/0210.html 

^[6] Email to author, October 7, 2008. The IASC thanks the NASA Public Affairs Office for relaying responses from USSTRATCOM to questions regarding the proximity of Shenzhou-7 and the ISS on September 27, 2008. 

^[7] Ibid. 

^[8] Zhang Pengfei, “Shenzhou 7 satellite back under control,” CCTV.com (English), October 2, 2007, http://www.cctv.com/english/20081002/100344.shtml; in contrast, both before and after its launch, writers from the Union of Concerned Scientists judged the BX-1 microsatellite posed no danger, see, David Wright and Gregory Kulacki, “Chinese Shenzhou 7 Companion Satellite Poses No Threat,” USC Backgrounder, September 26, 2008; Sara Sargent, “Analysis: China space launch raises fears,” United Press International, October 3, 2008, http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Analysis_China_space_launch_raises_fears_999.html 

^[9] Accompanying Satellite Begins Orbiting Shenzhou-7 Spaceship on Sunday,” Xinhua, October 5, 2008. 

^[10] “20^th Space Control Squadron wins first ever Lord Award,” Space Observer, Patterson AFB Colorado, October 2, 2008, pg. 14, http://www.csmng.com/images/spaceobserver/spaceobserver_2008-10-02.pdf 

^[11] Li Ming briefing recorded by Rob Coppinger, “IAC 2008: Video, Shenzhou-7 and future of China’s manned programme,” Hyperbola Blog, October 2, 2008, http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/hyperbola/2008/10/iac-2008-video-shenzhou7-futur.html#more 

^[12] “Giant Chinese space tracking ship makes rare visit,” October 27, 2005, http://newszealand.blogspot.com/2005/10/giant-chinese-space-tracking-ship.html 

^[13] Tariq Malik, “Space Station Dodges Orbital Junk,” August 28, 2008, http://www.livescience.com/blogs/author/tariqmalik/ 

^[14] “NASA-ISS On Obit Status, September 27, 2008,” SpaceRef.com, September 27, 2008, http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.rss.html?pid=29331 

^[15] “ISS orbit correction delayed to avoid collision with space litter,” Interfax-AVN, October 2, 2008, http://www.interfax.com/3/433089/news.aspx 

^[16] Dr. Ben Greene, “Laser Tracking of Space Debris,” 13th International Workshop on Laser Ranging Instrumentation, Washington, D.C., October 10, 2002. 

^[17] For a recent review of the tragic loss of Cosmonauts Georgiy Dobrovolskiy, Vladislav Volkov and Victor Patsayev, see Grujica S. Ivanovich, Salyut, The First Space Station, Triumph and Tragedy, Chichester: Praxis Publishing, 2008, Chapters 11 and 13. 

^[18] For analysis of the orbits of Shenzhou 5 and 6 see, Luciano Anselmo, “Orbital Analysis of the Shenzhou-6 Manned Mission In Support of the Malindi Tracking Station,” January 27, 2006. 

^[19] Anatoly Zak, “IS anti-satellite system,” Russianspaceweb.com, http://www.russianspaceweb.com/is.html 

^[20] For an excellent summary of Soviet military-Soyuz programs see Mark Wade, “Soyuz-R,” Encyclopedia Astronautica web page, http://www.astronautix.com/craft/soyuzr.htm  

^[21] Brian Harvey, The Rebirth of the Russian Space Program, 50 Years After Sputnik, New Frontiers, Chichester: Praxis, 2007, pg. 307; numerous official Chinese artists projections of a Chinese space station show a Russian APAS style docking system. 

^[22] At the 2000 Zhuhai Airshow an official from a European space company explained to the author how China was very interested in Europe’s development of space station technology. 

^[23] “Jiuquan Commander-in-Chief, Shenzhou 7’s Small Satellite Not Offensive,” China.com, September 22, 2008, http://www.china.com.cn/news/txt/2008-09/22/content_16517315.htm 

^[24] This assertion could be arguable in light of Soviet leader Gorbachev’s lack of enthusiasm for such programs, but they were all in stages of late development or early planning by the late 1980s. For a recent review of Soviet era space combat programs see Bill Rose, Secret Projects: Military Space Technology, Hersham: Midland Publishing, 2008, Chapter Five.

Gulf States Requesting ABM-Capable Systems

Gulf States Requesting ABM-Capable Systems

 

 

A 2007 US National Intelligence Assessment [redacted NIE summary] believes Iran’s nuclear program has stopped, but others, including the United Nations and Israel are more skeptical. Intelligence is always a very uncertain and ambiguous exercise, and occasionally features assessments like the infamous NIE (National Intelligence Estimate) whose 1962 judgment was that there were no Soviet missiles in Cuba [1]. Uncertainty creates perceptions of risk, and perceptions of risk lead to behaviors aimed at reducing that risk. Iraq is no longer a missile/WMD threat, Iran’s regular and Revolutionary Guards air forces remain relatively weak, and Iran’s ballistic missiles based on North Korean designs lack accuracy. Still, even a lucky conventional missile could create havoc in some Gulf states if it hit important oil-related infrastructure, or hit the larger and more nebulous target of business confidence. 

Arms spending is an incomplete but very concrete way of tracking a state’s real assessment of threats and priorities. It’s becoming clear that Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, have stepped up their defense spending in recent years. Those expenditures cover a range of equipment, but anti-ballistic missile capabilities appear to be rising to the top of the priority list. 

The latest development is Kuwait’s successful interception of ballistic missile targets during an exercise, using its Patriot systems… 

  

 

 

The Persian Gulf

Note that US DSCA announcements do not denote a firm contract. They are official requests, which remain before Congress for 30 days. If no positive action to block the Foreign Military Sale is successfully taken in Congress by the end of that period, the sale may go through once a contract is negotiated. 

Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) uses more advanced radar and electronics systems, coupled with a different, smaller missile that can be carried 16 to a launcher and use “hit to kill” methods. The older PAC-2 missiles are much larger at only 4 to a launcher, and use a fragmentation warhead with proximity fuze. Guidance Enhanced Missile (GEM-T) variants use PAC-2 missiles, coupled with select PAC-3 electronics, in order to improve performance and provide compatibility with PAC-3 batteries. 

Jan 11/10: Raytheon announces that Kuwait’s Air Defense Forces have successfully test fired a PAC-2 guidance system with PAC-2 GEM-T missiles against tactical ballistic missiles.  

The test firings were held in December 2009 during a joint exercise, at the Udairi Range in Kuwait. The Patriot system successfully engaged and destroyed 2 Patriot-as-a-Target missiles, as well as 3 foreign Multiple Launch Rocket System-type targets that were also emulating tactical ballistic missiles. 

Nov 16/09: The USA’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency announces [PDF] Kuwait’s official request to purchase 4 years of Patriot sustainment, including repair/return programs, associated spare parts, modification kits, equipment, Liaison Office Support Services, and US government and contractor support worth approximately $410 million. 

The principal contractor will be Raytheon Corporation in Tewksbury, MA. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale. 

June 29/09: Raytheon announces a $36.1 million Foreign Military Sales award to provide Kuwait with PAC-3 radar upgrade depot test equipment, training, and related technical services. 

This depot test equipment contract complements a June 27/08 order placed with Raytheon to upgrade Kuwait’s Patriot system to Configuration-3. The June 2008 order covers the upgrades, while the June 2009 order adds the equipment and services needed to maintain the upgraded equipment. Work under this contract will be done at 3 Raytheon centers in Massachusetts – Raytheon IDS headquarters in Tewksbury, the Integrated Air Defense Center in Andover, and the Surveillance and Sensors Center in Sudbury; as well as at the Seapower Capability Center in Portsmouth, RI. 

April 29/09: Raytheon names Roket Sanayii ve Ticaret A.S (Roketsan) of Ankara, Turkey as the sub-contractor who will integrate and test the control actuation system for the UAE’s Patriot GEM-T missiles. Roketsan will work with subcontractors throughout Turkey and the United States, coordinating and perform the major assembly work at its Ankara facility. The Raytheon release adds that: 

“Roketsan is Raytheon’s first major trans-Atlantic supplier strategically located to support the 11 countries in Europe and Asia, including several in the Middle East, that have chosen Patriot as a key component of their air and missile defense programs.” 

March 2/09: A $71.6 firm-fixed-price Letter Contract Modification contract to buy, install, and test 6 Radar Enhancement Phase 3 and Classification, Discrimination, and Identification Phase 3 modification kits for Kuwait’s Patriot radars. 

Work is to be performed at Andover, MA, with an estimated completion date of Oct 30/12. One bid was solicited and one bid received by the Aviation and Missile Command Contracting Center at Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, AL (W31P4Q-07-C-0151). See also Dec 4/07 entry. 

Feb 9/09: Raytheon announces a $246 million Foreign Military Sales contract from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), for Patriot system spares. The firm fixed price contract that is initially funded at $123 million, which represents the first delivery order awarded under a 5-year agreement for Patriot system spares. See Dec 17/08 for the main contract. 

Work will be performed by Raytheon’s Integrated Defense Systems at its headquarters in Tewksbury, MA; its Integrated Air Defense Center in Andover, MA; the Surveillance and Sensors Center in Sudbury, MA; and the Seapower Capability Center in Portsmouth, RI. The contract will be managed by the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, AL. 

Jan 14/09: The Khaleej Times quotes General (Ret.) Khaled Abdulla Al Bu-Ainnain, the former commander of the UAE air force and now President of The Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) defense think tank: 

“This in no way means that all these countries [in the emerging nuclear arc] are hostile to the UAE. But we cannot be blind to the risks and threats involved in these countries arming with nuclear capabilities. We may even become victims of cross-fires between different countries. Suppose Israel or the US attacks Iran, we could be caught in between. Our rulers have been acutely sensitive to these realities and are in the process building up a robust air defence system for the Emirates…. It is the ‘system of systems’ involving early detection, separation, elimination and the complete command control…. We had the potential to buy these missiles ten years ago. But we wanted to develop the human resources from within the UAE so that our people will be put in command. We want to defend the country through our own people, and not through outsiders.” 

This would also help to explain the developments reported in “UAE Looking to Become a Regional C2 Leader.” The Khaleej Times report adds: 

“Meanwhile, Federal National Council Member Ahmed Shabib Al Dhahiri told Khaleej Times on Tuesday that an estimated $100 million budget has been earmarked for UAE Nuclear Authority, which will implement the country’s peaceful nuclear programme.” 

As the Times reported, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco all confirmed their intent to begin nuclear power programs to the IAEA in 2006; the UAE and Tunisia were listed as possible additions. This announcement would appear to make the UAE program a certainty. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Patriot

Dec 17/08: Raytheon receives a not-to-exceed $3.3 billion order for Patriot Config-3 systems, including Patriot GEM-T and Lockheed PAC-3 missiles, whole life support, and training. 

Raytheon and teammate Lockheed Martin have worked with the U.S. and UAE governments during the past year to develop this agreement. The initial request was for up to 9 full fire units, with a stated maximum value of $9 billion. See the Dec 4/07 entry, and the Sept 9/08 Patriot order, for more background. 

Raytheon established its first office in the UAE in 1983, and began delivery and support of the medium range Hawk Air Defense System to the UAE in 1987. The Hawk has also been upgraded to have limited ABM capabilities, but the addition of Patriot 3 systems represents a major advance in capability for the UAE. Raytheon multimedia release. 

Sept 9/08: The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency announces [PDF] the United Arab Emirates’ request for 3 Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) Fire Units with 147 THAAD anti-ballistic missiles, 4 THAAD Radar Sets (3 tactical and one maintenance float), 6 THAAD Fire and Control Communication stations, and 9 THAAD Launchers. This would represent the first foreign sale of the THAAD system. 

The UAE is also requesting fire unit maintenance equipment, the heavy trucks that carry the THAAD components, generators, electrical power units, trailers, communications equipment, tools, test and maintenance equipment, repair and return, system integration and checkout, spare/repair parts, publications, documentation, personnel training, training equipment, contractor technical and logistics personnel services, and other related support elements. The estimated cost is $6.95 billion. 

The principal contractor is Lockheed Martin Space Systems Corporation in Sunnyvale, CA (THAAD), and the sub-contractor is Raytheon Corporation in Andover, MA (radar). 

The UAE will be requesting industrial offsets, which will be negotiated with these contractors. On the other hand, the UAE “does not desire a government support presence in its country on an extended basis.” A total of 66 contractor logistic support personnel could be stationed in United Arab Emirates for extended periods, and additional training and major defense equipment personnel may be in the United Arab Emirates for short periods of time, not to exceed 24 months. 

Sept 9/08: The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency announces [PDF] the United Arab Emirates’s official request for 4 Patriot PAC-3 missiles with containers, 19 MIM-104D Patriot Guided Enhanced Missiles-T (GEM-T) missiles with containers, 5 Anti-Tactical Missiles, and 5 Patriot Digital Missiles. These missiles are for lot validation and testing of the PAC-3 missiles notified for sale in the $9 billion Dec 4/07 request noted below, which would equip 9 full fire units. 

The estimated cost of this sale is $121 million, as it also includes AN/GRC-245 Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS Export), Power generation equipment, an Electric power plant, Trailers, Communication and support equipment, plus other related elements of support. 

The principal contractors are the Raytheon Corporation in Andover, MA; and Lockheed-Martin in Dallas, TX (PAC-3 missiles). The purchaser intends to request industrial offsets, but these will be negotiated with each contractor. An in-country field office will likely be manned by 1-4 U.S. Government personnel who will remain in country for an undetermined length of time, and 65 contractor personnel are expected to be in country for an extended period for training purposes. 

Sept 9/08: The UAE also submits DSCA requests for several hundred Surface-Launched AMRAAM missiles, and 78 complete AVENGER fire units which offer a mounted, networked platform and radar set that can accommodate very-short range Stinger missiles and .50 caliber machine guns. The SL-AMRAAM order provides all the equipment needed to mount the missiles in static positions, or on existing vehicles. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

THAAD operations concept

Sept 8/08: Reuters reports that the UAE is about to make an official request for THAAD theater-level ABM interceptors, and associated systems. If the request goes through, the sale could be worth up to $7 billion. 

June 27/08: Raytheon Integrated Defense in Andover, MA receives a $76.5 million firm fixed price / cost-plus-fixed-fee, level of effort contract to upgrade 6 Patriot Radar Sets to PAC-3-Kuwait configuration. Work will be performed at Andover, MA with an expected completion date of July 31/13. One bid was solicited with 1 bid received (W31P4Q-07-C-0151). 

Raytheon’s July 15/08 release refers to it as a $156 million contract, which indicates that the DefenseLINK announcement covered the 50% initial payment, with the rest to follow. It also notes that the Kuwaiti upgrades are very similar to the upgrades the US Army is implementing under its “Pure Fleet” initiative. A 2009 release later reports the value of this contract as $148 million. 

Dec 4/07: Kuwait already deploys Patriot PAC-2 missiles, alongside MBDA’s less capable Spada medium-range air defense system. The Spadas received a March 2007 contract for upgrades to Spada 20000 status, which will improve their effectiveness against aircraft and cruise missiles but will not give them anti ballistic missile capabilities. The PAC-2 has some ABM capability to go with its excellent capabilities against aircraft and cruise missiles, but it has limitations. 

All that will change if the DSCA’s announced request [PDF] from Kuwait’s goes through: 

• 80 PAC-3 Missiles
• Patriot GEM-T Modification Kits to upgrade 60 PAC-2 missiles
• 6 Patriot System Configuration 3 Modification kits to upgrade PATRIOT Radars to REP III

• Plus communication support equipment, tools and test equipment, system integration and checkout, installation, personnel training, containers, spare and repair parts, publications and technical data, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics personnel services, and other related elements of program support.

The estimated cost is $1.363 billion, and the prime contractor will be the Raytheon Corporation of Andover, MA. This is somewhat expensive, given the scale of the activities requested. One clue may be found later in the request, which hints that extensive support and maintenance work is part of this contract: “upon implementation of this proposed sale, two U.S. Government representatives and 25 contractor personnel will be assigned to Kuwait for a period of 3-5 years.” The DSCA adds that: 

“The proposed sale and upgrade will bring Kuwait’s assets in line with U.S. PATRIOT assets, and ensure Kuwait maintains the ability to protect its borders. Kuwait needs this Air Defense System to develop an organic capability that will be responsive to hostile aircraft or missile threats upon its sovereign territory. The PATRIOT Air Defense System will go far in improving a current operational deficiency revealed during the Gulf War.” 

PAC-3 systems and GEM upgrades have been available for some time since that period, of course, but it has risen to the top of the priority list now. 

Dec 4/07: The United Arab Emirates, which includes Dubai, currently depends on Improved Hawk missiles, plus Croatale (older version, not NG) and Rapier missile systems for short-range air defense (SHORAD), and Sweden’s RBS-70 man-portable, laser-guided VSHORAD. This system offers good point coverage against cruise missiles and aircraft, and their 50 Russian Pantsyr-S1 missile/gun systems with revised and improved radars promise further improvements. 

The Pantsyrs should be arriving by now, and full deployment is expected by 2009; they will likely replace the Croatale and/or Rapier batteries. Now the DSCA announces [PDF format] the United Arab Emirates’ official request for a high-end complement that adds ABM capabilities as well as improved air defense: 

• 288 PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles
• 216 Guidance Enhanced Missiles-T (GEM-T)
• 9 PATRIOT Fire Units that includes:
  • 10 phased array radar sets
  • 10 Engagement Control Stations on trailers
  • 37 Launching Stations (4 per fire unit)
  • 8 Antenna Mast Groups (AMG) on trailers
  • 8 Antenna Mast Group (AMG) Antennas for Tower Mounts
  • AN/GRC-245 Radios
  • Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS, Export)
  • Multifunctional Information Distribution System/Low Volume Terminals (Link 16)
• Plus trailers, generators, electrical power units, communication and support equipment, publications, spare and repair parts, repair and return, United States Government and contractor technical assistance and other related elements of logistics support.

The estimated cost is $9 billion, and the principal contractors will be Raytheon Corporation of Andover, MA, and Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control in Dallas, TX. The purchaser intends to request offsets, but agreements are undetermined and will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and contractor. 

The Patriot is a new defensive system for the UAE, and implementation of this proposed sale will require the assignment of U.S. Government or contractor representatives to United Arab Emirates. An in-country field office will likely be manned by 1-4 U.S. Government personnel who will remain in country for “an undetermined length of time.” A total of 26 contractor personnel are also expected to be in-country for “an extended period” to provide training. 

Oct 30/07: “Saudis May Go Russian As France Loses Out” includes rumors that Saudi Arabia’s Russian military purchases may soon add S-300 and S-400 long-range surface-air missile systems with anti ballistic missile capabilities. The previous odds-on favorite was MBDA’s Aster 30 SAMP/T, which also has ABM capabilities but sports a shorter range. 

Oct 16/07: The AN/TPS-59 is a theater defense class radar with a full 360 degree azimuth scan over a 740 km/ 400 nautical mile range results in a surveillance volume of 603 million km3. It has been used in tests to track and shoot down ballistic missiles, as well as conventional aircraft. See “Bahrain Receives TPS-59 Missile Defense Radar” for background re: the recent fulfillment of this 2004 contract. 

End Notes & Additional Readings 

¹ Angelo Codevilla, Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century, pp. 201-203. Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan Canada© 1992. 

• DID (Dec 12/07) – UAE Looking to Become a Regional C2 Leader. Of course, excellent command, control, and communications is the foundation of any effective air and missile defense capability.

• Federation of American Scientists Space Policy Project – Estimated Surface-To-Air Missile Inventories

• Anthony Cordesman – The Military Balance in the Middle East (Google book preview)

Israel’s vaunted missile shield ‘flawed’

Israel’s vaunted missile shield ‘flawed’

Despite all the media fanfare and ballyhoo about the impending deployment of another missile-defense system, Israeli commentators are warning that the Jewish state’s much-vaunted defense shield has a few chinks in it.

The Defense Ministry announced on Jan. 7 that Iron Dome, which is designed to shoot down short-range missiles and mortar shells, had sailed through a series of test-firings with flying colors.

The first operational battery would soon be deployed on the southern front against the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip to counter rockets fired by the Palestinian militants.

Iron Dome is intended to be the bottom layer in a missile defense shield, with the U.S.-financed long-range, high-altitude Arrow II interceptor, first deployed in 2001, to take care of ballistic missiles, and the David’s Sling system, still at least two years away from deployment, designed to counter intermediate-range missiles.

But Rueven Pedatzur of the liberal daily Haaretz opened up with a barrage of criticism that appeared to shoot a few holes in the official line that Israelis could rest assured that they were fully protected from hostile missiles.

Iron Dome, which cost Rafael Advanced Defense Industries $200 million to develop “has brought nothing to the table,” he wrote on Wednesday, “and it has not solved the inherent problems of a defense system based on missiles trying to intercept enemy rockets Â…

“The rejoicing and the preening in the wake of the (Iron Dome) test’s success hide the far bleaker truth.

“The public relations campaign accompanying the test is full of deceptions and half-truths. It has ignored the flaws in the systems and has created illusions.”

For one thing, he declared, “the stock of Iron Dome missiles is liable to run out way before the rocket barrages end.

“And in any case, because of the high cost of using Iron Dome for defense, the Palestinians in the south and Hezbollah in the north can defeat us at the bank, without even launching a single rocket.”

One Iron Dome interception will cost about $100,000, he calculated, while Hamas’ homemade Qassam rockets only cost at most $200 apiece.

At that rate, Israel would soon run into the red if it is faced, as most strategist expect it will be some time in the near future, round-the-clock bombardments with thousands of Qassams, Katyushas and Grads unleashed by Hezbollah and Hamas, both armed by Iran.

During the 34-day war between Hezbollah and Israel in July-August 2006, Hezbollah fired nearly 4,000 rockets of various calibers into northern Israel at a rate of around 200 a day.

That paralyzed the north, including the port city of Haifa, for more than a month. The death toll, given the number of rockets fired, was relatively light — 54, mostly civilians.

But the sustained bombardment, the worst ever endured by Israel’s civilians, had a profound and immense psychological impact and heightened fears of the deadlier bombardments the strategists expect somewhere down the road.

In 2006 Hezbollah alone was believed to have around 12,000 rockets. These days it’s reputed to have around 42,000, including some that can reach Tel Aviv, Israel’s largest urban conurbation.

But Pedatzur wasn’t finished. Rafael’s David’s Sling system, also known as Magic Wand, would be even more expensive to use than Iron Dome, he observed. “The price of one missile in this system will come to about $1 million.”

All told, the overall cost of developing Arrow II, Iron Dome and David’s Sling will probably eventually run to around $2 billion, although much of the Arrow’s development cost was paid by Washington.

But just for Iron Dome, the defense establishment is still trying to figure out how many batteries will be needed to provide a blanket defense of the northern and southern borders.

It’s not clear whether anyone has yet considered the possibility of rocket fire from the West Bank as well. But the current estimate is 20 batteries for north and south, with each battery costing $14 million.

To cover that, said Pedatzur’s colleague, Amos Harel, “will either require diverting substantial funds from other defense projects or significantly increasing the defense budget.”

Even with Iron Dome, “protection of Israel’s home front remains far from complete,” Harel concluded.

Although Arrow II and Iron Dome are being deployed, he cautioned, “in the face of a possible onslaught involving thousands of missiles and tens of thousands of rockets, this will not be enough.”

Russia denies fleet boost over US Poland missile plan

Russia on Thursday said it had no plans to boost the arsenal of its Baltic Fleet in response to Poland’s announcement that the United States will deploy Patriot-type missiles close to Russian borders.

“No changes are planned in the combat components of the Baltic Fleet in connection with the deployment of US Patriot missiles close to the border with Russia,” the defence ministry said in a statement carried by news agencies.

Earlier, the RIA Novosti news agency had quoted a high-ranking official in the Baltic Fleet as saying Russia would be boosting the weaponry of the fleet’s ships, submarines and aircraft in response to the Polish announcement.

“The underwater, surface and air components of the fleet will be strengthened,” the source told the news agency.

He said that ships would be equipped with highly accurate, longer-range missiles while the defences of submarines would also be boosted. There was no immediate explanation for the discrepancy in the reports.

The defence ministry statement said that any moves to rearm and modernize Russia’s navy — including the Baltic Fleet — would take place within the framework of an already announced military reform drive.

Poland’s Defence Minister Bogdan Klich said Wednesday the Patriot-type surface-to-air missiles would be deployed in northern Poland some 60 kilometres (35 miles) from the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad.

He insisted the choice of the site close to Kaliningrad had “no political or strategic meaning — its good infrastructure is the only reason.” The Patriot missiles could arrive as soon as late March or early April, Klich said.

President Barack Obama in September scrapped a plan agreed in 2008 to install a controversial anti-missile shield system in Poland and the Czech Republic that had enraged Russia.

Countermeasures Capabilities Become Clearer

For U.S. helicopter pilots in particular, Afghanistan is a new battlefield with new threats. And as troops and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance resources pour into the theater, rotary-wing use will quickly escalate.

Already, a CH-47—newly modified with an advanced laser-based defense system for operations in Iraq/Afghanistan—was able to fight its way out of a “complex [combat] situation where the Chinook was engaged by multiple infrared man-portable air defense missiles,” says U.S. Army Lt. Col. Ray Pickering, product manager for infrared countermeasures (IRCM). The crowning success for any enemy offensive effort would be to shoot down a helicopter, he says. “A Chinook with 30 people on board would be a global news event. If we lost a CH-47 a week for six weeks, the war would be over.”

In Afghanistan, the Chinook is especially important because of its ability to operate at high altitudes. The demand for the heavy-lift platform ensures it will be targeted often.

“We have a missile-warning system that can identify missiles by type, we have flares to deflect IR missiles, and we have a laser-equipped Atircm [Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasures] that can defeat any missile in current use,” Pickering says. He adds, however, “we know there are bigger and better missiles that could show up.”

Other Army officials tell Aviation Week that Atircm can defeat the Russian-built SA-16 missile, and that “we have not seen any SA-18s in theater,” although they are known to be available on the black market.

“One of the trends that I’m seeing that keeps me awake, especially in a complex asymmetric threat environment like Afghanistan, is the use of a lot of low-tech weapons,” says Michael Maas, BAE Systems’ chief technical officer for survivability and protection solutions. “Anyone can buy a high-tech, laser range-finder and night-vision or low-light thermal-vision hardware on the Internet for $10,000—and some of these insurgents have deep pockets. When they couple high-tech sensors with low-tech weapons, they can phenomenally increase their effectiveness. It’s a real challenge for us, as an industry, to deal with those threats.”

Part of the first wave of quick-reaction capabilities ordered in July 2008 by the U.S. Army was fielding of the Atircm-AN/ALQ-212(V) which includes IR sensors to detect enemy anti-aircraft missiles and laser-based jam heads to confuse and deflect their IR guidance.

More precisely, Atircm steers a beam of jamming energy that is modulated—using the systems library of threat signatures—specifically to disable or misdirect a particular type of enemy missile’s seeker.

“We’ve already fielded a company of [13 upgraded] Chinooks in theater,” Pickering says. “We will upgrade the rest of the Chinooks in Iraq and Afghanistan during the next year [as they move through phased-cycle maintenance].”

“We fielded the first aircraft in mid-October, several weeks ahead of the Army’s expectations,” says Tom Kirkpatrick, BAE Systems’ program manager for the Atircm effort. “The initial request was for all deployed CH-47s to be equipped with Atircm, and we’re delivering.”

BAE Systems already had personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan to support the Common Missile Warning System (CMWS), which early last year surpassed more than 1 million combat flight hours. BAE’s manufacturing facility in New Hampshire serves as the depot, but the company also deployed additional service representatives into the theater of operations for the Atircm program. So far, BAE Systems has delivered more than 70 laser jam heads and 70 multi-band lasers.

The company says the fielded version of the Atircm followed a series of rigorous qualifications through field and flight tests, and that the Atircm and CMWS (which uses chaff and flares) cooperate against evolving threats. Atircm’s multi-band laser has an infrared countermeasures capability that provides laser jamming in several threat bands, which further enhances the missile-warning suite.

“The addition of Atircm provides an added layer of protection, but it does it in a less conspicuous way than flares. Response of the CMWS is a little easier to confirm in the field,” Kirkpatrick says. “You get a warning and you see a dispense of chaff and/or flares. Atircm works a bit differently. Its laser reaches out a [longer] distance to add protection.”

BAE Systems is also applying technology for the U.S. Army’s Common Infrared Countermeasures (Circm) and the U.S. Navy’s Joint Allied Threat Awareness System (Jatas) programs. The Circm program is derived from the Atircm/CMWS effort, but is designed to provide the Army with a smaller, lighter-weight solution for other rotary-wing aircraft. Along with detection of guided surface-to-air missiles, the Jatas system will detect and locate the source of fire from small arms and unguided missiles such as the rocket-propelled grenade.

Part of the long-term problem for contractors is being able to predict what enemy weaponry is going to be in 2-4 years when the current weapons under development are finally fielded.

There are some fascinating possibilities for the longer term. A strong IR or laser surveillance source—operated as a radar in the terahertz frequency range—can scan across a battlefield to create minute light reflections that can be detected by a sensitive IR receiver. These reflections contain information that can reveal and identify the passive sensor, creating the reflection, including night-vision goggles worn by an individual or infrared sensors associated with a particular weapon.

The concept is to find “passive receivers looking at you,” says Mark Hutchins, a program manager for Circm in BAE Systems’ survivability and protection solutions business unit. “The idea is to see a glint of reflected laser light. To do so will require more energy content, but every optical system will provide a return that can be exploited.”

“Electronic warfare used to be focused on passive countermeasures,” Maas says. “But now the lines between [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and EW] technologies are getting more blurred every day. Active detection is [possible by] sensors looking at sensors. Better sensor fusion could let you see the source of small-arms fire and other threats that are out of band and that use different parts of the spectrum. You could perhaps detect [communications] networks. Then you could geo-locate and attack emitters, jam links and disrupt communications.”

Convergence of technologies is driving the integration of many types of sensor data. At the same time it is creating the need for advanced algorithms and massive processing power to make it all work together.

“If you provide the pilot and co-pilot with missile, laser, small-arms and radar warning—all as separate alerts—it could be too distracting,” Maas says. “Say there is a laser range-finder and a radar that is associated with single weapon—a missile or an anti-aircraft gun. You want a single display that says, ‘It’s a ZSU [anti-aircraft gun] and actively shooting at us using a laser range-finder.’ If you have door gunners, you can give them clues and they can make the decision to fire, or you can provide the information to an attack helicopter.”

That also brings into focus another long-term development effort.

“We’ve done a lot with hostile unguided weapons fire,” Hutchins says. “You have to rapidly locate people shooting at you. Then, do I maneuver rapidly or pass the information to someone else who can engage them more effectively? I think that’s a lot of our future focus—more integrated, more network-centric electronic warfare. We’re now a sensor in the network and we need to get information from that network in a timely fashion about what we are facing.”

Finally, in parallel to the convergence in technologies, specialists face a convergence in combat and non-combat threats. They believe that technologies used to detect enemy fire also can be used to lessen other dangers.

“Threats to the platform also include flying into trees, wires, each other and the ground,” says Maas. “Navigation, terrain-following and EW systems are overlapping and merging. There is a fusion of sensor and processing technology that would allow us to deal with all those threats. A major problem we would like to solve is brownout, and it happens in the last 50 ft. and last few seconds of a flight. It doesn’t take much to get disoriented and there is a tremendous lack of depth perception.”

Information from IR and millimeter-wave-band transmitters could be fused in a single picture, so that aircrews could see the landscape and nearby objects through dust, for example.

Pentagon Stuck to its Oft-Repeated View that China’s First Priority is to Build a Broad-Based Capability to Prevent Taiwanese independence

China is developing the ability to limit or prevent the use of satellites by potential adversaries during times of crisis, the Pentagon said Monday in a report to Congress. The report, the latest in a series of annual assessments of China’s military power, says Beijing views its efforts in space warfare as not only a practical advance of military power but also a boost to national prestige. In space and other aspects of China’s military modernization, the Pentagon stuck to its oft-repeated view that China’s first priority is to build a broad-based capability to prevent Taiwanese independence. It said China’s focus on space warfare is an important part of that Taiwan strategy. “China further views the development of space and counter-space capabilities as bolstering national prestige and, like nuclear weapons, demonstrating the attributes of a world power,” the report said. China typically objects to the Pentagon’s depiction of its military programs and policies. The Chinese Embassy in Washington did not immediately return a message seeking comment on Monday’s report. At a Pentagon news conference, David Sedney, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia, predicted the Chinese would protest this year that the report is “anti-China” and misleading. Sedney said that for the first time, U.S. and Chinese officials will meet to discuss the report; he said it was being briefed Monday to China’s senior military representative in Washington.

The Chinese military, known as the People’s Liberation Army, is acquiring technologies to improve its ability to operate in space and is “developing the ability to attack an adversary’s space assets,” the report said. “PLA writings emphasize the necessity of ’destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemy’s reconnaissance/observation and communications satellites,’ suggesting that such systems, as well as navigation and early warning satellites, could be among initial targets of attack to ‘blind and deafen the enemy,” the report said. The Bush administration was highly critical of China’s shootdown in January 2007 of one of its weather satellites, asserting that the orbiting debris created by the attack poses a danger to other assets in space.

Last month, when the Pentagon shot down a dead U.S. spy satellite, China expressed concern, although U.S. officials said the shootdown did not mean the United States had dropped its objections to possessing a permanent anti-satellite capability. More broadly, the Pentagon report released Monday asserted that Beijing’s reluctance to share details about its military buildup poses a risk to stability in Asia. It said the international community has limited knowledge of the motivations, decision-making and capabilities of China’s military modernization. This includes a lack of clarity about China’s defense spending. Washington contends that Beijing understates that spending program by the equivalent of tens of billions of dollars.

“The lack of transparency in China’s military and security affairs poses risks to stability by increasing the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation,” the report said. “This situation will naturally and understandably lead to hedging against the unknown.” This year’s report place increased emphasis on concern about China’s space programs and potential for space warfare. It also said China is improving its own satellite capability, including construction of a new satellite launch complex on Hainan Island. And it said China expects to replace all foreign-produced satellites in its inventory with home-produced models by 2010. In a similar vein, the report said China appears to be developing a cyberwarfare capability. “In the past year, numerous computer networks around the world, including those owned by the U.S. government, were subject to intrusions that appear to have originated within the PRC,” the report said, using the initials for the People’s Republic of China. “These intrusions require many of the skills and capabilities that would also be required for computer network attack.” The overall military buildup in China has increased in recent years, the Pentagon said. “China’s expanding and improving military capabilities are changing East Asian military balances; improvements in China’s strategic capabilities have implications beyond the Asia-Pacific region,” the report said. The main short-term focus of China’s military buildup is the Taiwan Strait, the report said. As of November 2007, the Chinese military had deployed between 990 and 1,070 short-range ballistic missiles to garrisons opposite Taiwan, according to the Pentagon’s latest estimate. That compares with 900 such missiles reported in last year’s Pentagon report. Every spring, the Pentagon is required by Congress to provide a comprehensive assessment of China’s security and military strategy, an analysis of developments in its military doctrine and capabilities, and an update on the security situation in the Taiwan Strait. U.S.-China military relations have been strained in recent years over numerous issues, not limited to American concerns about the scope of Beijing’s military buildup. But there also have been some positive moves, including two agreements signed last week in Shanghai — one on installing a telephone hotline between the Chinese Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Defense Department, and the other on research in Chinese military archives related to U.S. MIAs from the Korean War.

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